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TARGETED INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND GOVERNMENT FAILURES: INSIGHTS 
FROM THE SOUTH KOREAN EXPERIENCE
ABSTRACT
Purpose
This paper reflects on the efficiency and effectiveness of industrial policies by focusing on 
the peculiar experience of South Korea. It analyses Korean structural change from an 
historical and empirical standpoint, highlighting industrial policy interventions involved in 
this process. The analysis presented offers important insights to inform the debate on the 
contemporary industrial policy, identifying specific elements and circumstances that can 
contribute to mitigate government failures and to improve the effectiveness of public 
action.
Methodology
The paper adopts an historical and empirical perspective. Concerning the empirical 
analysis, a composite indicator to assess the process of structural change of economies is 
presented. This methodology provides annual rankings based on the different economic 
relevance of the manufacturing sectors over the period 1963-2012.
Findings
The paper shows that industrial policy has been extensively involved in South Korean 
structural development but public intervention interacted with several other factors, 
including gradual markets liberalization, education, societal and cultural characteristics and 
low level of income inequalities. As a result, economic development is conceived as 
systemic process, namely as the outcome of a balance in the roles played by government, 
markets and civil society.  In this framework, government failures, as inability of the 
government to respond effectively and efficiently to the general interest of the society, are 
intimately inherent to the mechanisms that rules the relevant relationships within the 
system.
Originality
In the post crisis debate, very few attention has been devoted in academic and political 
debate to the ways to mitigate government failures. By analysing the historical and recent 
Korean experience with industrial policy, the paper addresses an issue insufficiently 
analysed offering an innovative contribute.
Keywords: Industrial development, Industrial policy, Composite indicator, South Korea
JEL classifications: L50, L60, O14, M00
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One of the effects of the 2008 Global Crisis has been to re-open at political and academic 
level the debate on the role of the government in contemporary economies. After an epoch 
of liberalizations, privatizations and reduction of the government’s role in economic 
dynamics, a rejuvenation of industrial policies (Stiglitz and Lin, 2013) has characterized 
public action i  many industrialized and emerging countries in an attempt to address short-
term and structural problems raised by the recession (Bianchi and Labory 2011; Cowling 
and Tomlinson 2011; Lin 2012; Mazzucato 2013; Stiglitz and Lin 2013; Di Tommaso and 
Schweitzer 2013). In this context, however, very few attention has been devoted to new 
ways to mitigate severe government failures.
The government failures’ literature, emerged during the last forty years, highlights the 
weaknesses of the public action and shows circumstances in which costs of industrial 
policy can be higher than its benefits. On the one hand, the risk that selective industrial 
policy responds to particular interests, and not to more general public interest, is extremely 
high. Stimulus to rent-seeking activities, corruption and nepotism are just some of the 
points stressed at theoretical level to exclude industrial policy from the political agenda. On 
the other hand, industrial policy risks failing simply because of a lack of information on the 
targets. For example, possible inability of governments to “pick the winners” capable of 
competing in markets and protection given to inefficient firms can generate enormous 
waste of public money with poor long-term benefit for the society (Krueger 1990; Chang 
1994; Lerner 2009; Di Tommaso and Schweitzer 2013; Schuck 2014).
In this context, industrial policy continues to be implemented as an answer to 
economic and social problems in many countries whilst its supporting theory appears often 
inadequate to explain how, why and when such intervention could be desirable or not. Very 
few space has been left to rigorous analysis of industrial practices around the world, with 
the aim of genuinely understanding source of success and failure of the public intervention 
in different economic, historical and cultural contexts. 
This paper focuses on the development experience of South Korea in order to inform 
the current debate on industrial policy. Indeed, the Korean case has attracted huge attention 
from academic and political observers (see, e.g., Woo, 1991; Lie, 1998; Mo and Weingast, 
2013; Unger and Chan, 2015; Oh and Jun, 2016). From agricultural economy in 1950s, a 
“big push” is occurred in 1960s and 1970s which has led South Korea to be one of the most 
competitive industrialized economies of the world. This impressive structural development 
has been interpreted in various ways in academic literature, and it seems clear that there is 
not unanimity about the factors that have contributed to the economic development of the 
country. While the dispute lays mainly on the ancient antagonism “State vs. Market”, this 
paper aims at going beyond a dichotomist approach by analyzing Korean industrial 
development as outcome of the relationship between government, markets and civil society, 
in a systemic process interacting with peculiar economic and historical circumstances, 
founding the success or failure of development actions. The historical and empirical 
analysis presented in the work offers insights to inform the debate on the contemporary 
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industrial policy, identifying specific elements and conditions that can contribute to 
mitigate government failures and to improve the effectiveness of the public action.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section outlines the main theories on 
South Korean industrial development. The neoclassical view, the developmental state 
approach and the culturalist view are considered as the main competing theories. Section 3 
provides an historical overview of the Korean industrialization, from the period of the 
dictatorship that ruled the country in 1960s and 1970s up to the Crisis of 2008. Section 4 
analyses the recent industrial strategy and the new paradigm of the Creative Economy, 
which is generally defined as an economic system based on creative products, where 
people’s creativity is the main source of economic value (Howkins, 2001). Section 5 aims 
at assessing empirically the process of South Korea’s structural change. It presents the 
construction of a composite indicator, in order to empirically analyze the industrial 
evolution of the Korean economy over time. Section 6 provides concluding remarks 
focusing on the possible sources of success and failures of government action in South 
Korean industrial development.
2. Competing theories on South Korean industrialization: an overview
The South Korean economic development has been interpreted in various ways in academic 
literature. This section aims to briefly present the main theories explaining the factors that 
have contributed to the economic development of the country. In particular, we highlight 
the essential features of three interpretations: the neoclassical approach, the developmental 
state approach and the culturalist approach.
The neoclassical approach focuses on the functioning of market mechanism and 
argues that the Korean development might be explained using the traditional catch-up 
theory. According to this approach, Korea’s development experience is essentially based on 
the mobilization of inputs and trade liberalizations, which generate an increase in exports 
and investments. In this framework, Krugman (1994) and Young (1995) use the 
neoclassical model of “growth accounting” to explain the sources of economic 
development in South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan. In this model, capital 
stock, amount of work and technology are the determinants of growth, while the effects of 
government industrial policies should be substantiated by improvements in technology and 
efficiency, namely in increments of so-called total factor productivity (TFP). The authors 
come to similar conclusions: the growth of the “Asian tigers” has othing extraordinary, 
given that it is largely due to a huge increase in capital and labor factors. The role of the 
public policy was, moreover, marginal given the low growth of TFP, indicating a modest 
technological progress. Young (1995) in particular argues that “neoclassical growth theory 
[...] can explain most of the difference between the performance of the NICs and that of 
other postwar economies” (Young, 1995, p. 175). In this context, in line with the 
neoclassical approach, the market-friendly view emphasizes that the reliance on exports was 
the key of success of South Korean industrialization, and that the economic growth got 
started only when Korean firms were able to compete on international markets (Balassa, 
1988; Krueger, 1990). According to this interpretation, the process of internationalization 
led to higher levels of efficiency for Korean firms and to the reallocations of productive 
factors in sectors characterized by comparative advantage. In this framework, the most 
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important assignment for the state was to remove tariffs and other constraints to trade. As 
for the internal affairs, the state ought to restrict its action to correcting situations of market 
failure. In other words, public policies were fundamental as far as they keep a good 
investment climate (Stiglitz, 1996). In this context, the government’s role would be limited 
to providing adequate infrastructure, maintaining macroeconomic stability and promoting 
investment in physical and human capital. Other measures to promote specific industrial 
sectors, such as support for heavy industries in Korea, would have been ineffective both 
from the point of view of the evolution of the industrial structure and from the point of 
view of technical progress (Krueger, 1990, p. 110; World Bank, 1993, p. 312). Holcombe 
(2013) is even clearer in his judgment on the role of the state, stating that the government 
incentives have not only been ineffective, but should have been avoided. This is because 
public resources have gone to the business realities that in the past had proven innovative 
and competitive but, in the long run, this type of industrial policy would hold back 
economic growth, preventing those who kept innovating from competing with the 
incumbents on equal conditions. In this sense, the merits of the miracle are related to the 
great abundance of work force and to the low level of labor costs at the beginning of the 
1960s. Like other developing countries, South Korea could take advantage of its low level 
of capital accumulation combined with the decreasing returns to scale of the capital in order 
to catch up rapidly on advanced economies. Evidence for this hypothesis would be the fact 
that the economic growth decelerated as the process of convergence went on. In this 
context, the role of the state, which implemented measures of import substitution and 
export promotion, has been totally ineffective (or even counterproductive according to 
some scholars).
On the contrary, the developmental state approach emphasizes the role of industrial 
policies. It asserts that without government intervention it would not have been possible for 
Korean firms to face the competition on international markets (Chang, 1994, Di Maio, 
2009). The developmental state can be defined as a complex organization, featured by the 
collaboration between an expert bureaucratic apparatus and the private sector, which aims 
to achieve pre-established economic and social development objectives (Amsden, 2001; 
Doner et al., 2005). In this context, public incentives and subsidies were necessary to allow 
firms to acquire and use advanced technologies from industrialized countries. A mechanism 
of reciprocal control between the private sector and the bureaucracy was set to give to the 
bureaucratic agencies control over the economic performances of firms, which in turn 
received subsidies of different nature (e.g. fiscal benefits, preferential loans, support by 
public funding programs). This kind of subsidies were granted on condition that firms 
managed to achieve specific prearranged standards (Amsden, 2001).
Finally, some other researchers have also studied the relationship between economic 
development and specific characteristics of the Korean society, related to the solid 
Confucian tradition, high quality of education and exceptionally low levels of income and 
wealth inequality. Specifically, this so-called culturalist approach emphasizes the 
relevance of the Confucian doctrine in Korean economic development, which promoted 
meritocracy, morality, honesty and competence in the bureaucratic body and civil society, 
encouraging investments in education, equality and hard work in economic life as social 
values (see, e.g. Bertoldi, 1996).
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3. The historical evolution of South Korean industrial policies
3.1 The Korean economy during the Japanese domination and the military rule
Korean peninsula had been part of the Japanese empire since the first decades of the 20th 
Century. Under the Japanese colonial government, Korea moved its first steps toward 
industrialization. Despite agriculture remained the main economic activity of the country, 
which still had a medieval organization, some factories were built, along with some 
transport, financial and commercial infrastructure (Amsden, 1989; Kim and Koh, 2010). 
Other relevant changes of this period were the introduction of a judicial system and of an 
education system.
When United States took control of the southern part of the country after World War 
II, establishing the modern state of South Korea, agricultural land reform was its first 
concern. The reform enhanced the distribution of lands and incomes laying the bases for the 
rise of the entrepreneurial middle class, that would have been crucial for the future 
economic development (Amsden, 1989; Suh, 2007). Indeed, increasing equality in income 
distribution and in general level of education since the Japanese domination, were creating 
a system founding on a civil society ready to actively participate to the economic and 
political life of the country. In this setting the development trajectory of the country could 
have been defined starting from a convergence of interests within the Korean society 
toward industrial development, as a rather homogeneous collective goal to pursue.
Despite the US influence, that was promoting markets liberalization, the first 
republican government led by Syngman Rhee, intervened in favor of light industries, by 
introducing protectionist measures against competitive imports. But it was with the General 
Park Chung-hee’s military rule that South Korea started a radical process of 
industrialization. A student revolution in 1960 overthrowing the previous Syngman Rhee’s 
(corrupt) government and the subsequent Park’s military coup of 1961 placed economic 
modernization at the top of the Korean political agenda (see, e.g., Lim, 2013). Indeed, the 
popular pressures of that time were forceful in constraining any new government to create 
new institutions and implement a development strategy for the country.
Park administration’s strategy for economic growth envisaged a fundamental role for 
large enterprises. Essentially, the role of the government was aimed to foster the growth of 
large industrial groups by defining economic plans through which it could coordinate 
investments and check results reached by the private economic agents. In this context, the 
government began to implement import substitution and export promotion measures by 
allocating important public resources to long-term investment plans, incentives and 
subsidies for manufacturing companies (sacrificing short-term social spending) (Amsden, 
1989). Indeed, the government main aim was to make South Korea an independent 
economy by substituting foreign goods with national productions (Chang, 1994).
However, at the beginning of 1960s, the Korean industrial structure was mainly 
characterized by light industries (and in particular textile sector) that were the most 
important source of value added (see Table 1). On the one hand, these sectors were an 
important springboard for economic development and started initially to be foster by the 
government, since they required less expensive investments and labor force compared to 
the heavy industries. On the other hand, in order to upgrade light industries, South Korea 
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needed to import capital goods, machineries and technology from abroad, that were lacking 
in the national economy (Colman e Nixon, 1994). Therefore technology was purchased 
from industrialized countries, even if in many cases South Korea did not have the necessary 
skills to apply it. In this framework government’s subsidies were crucial to cover the costs 
of acquiring this “social capital” (as Abramovitz, 1986, called all these competences), that 
could also be higher than the benefits deriving from having advanced low-cost production 
methods (Khan and Blankenburg, 2009). 
Indeed, the presence of public subsidies for promoting the acquisition of technology 
was typical in any of the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs). In these countries, 
technology and capital goods came from industrialized countries and, in many cases, firms 
faced the lack of competence to employ them. Public resources and the concession of 
subsidies represented a way to reduce the cost of using advanced technology and eventually 
promoted its acquisition (Khan and Blankenburg, 2009). Nevertheless, despite several 
countries experienced the use of government’s subsidies to private companies in order to 
upgrade technology and industrial capacities, only few of them were able to get effective 
results avoiding dramatic waste of public money and government failures. In South Korean 
one of the elements deemed necessary for a virtuous relationship between government and 
private companies was a mechanism of reciprocity (Di Maio, 2009). This mechanism 
consisted in an exchange between public institutions and companies whereby public 
institutions gave the subsidies while the companies had to report periodically their 
economic performance. This disclosure was necessary to verify the achievement of the 
arranged targets; if that was not the case, the transfer of public resource had to be 
suspended. In general, the amount of exports, the number of foreign markets served, the 
share of local content in goods produced are examples of standards used in this mechanism. 
This mechanism structured the government-industry relationship in a way to avoid potential 
establishment of permanent rent positions for private companies (which is one of the most 
common source of government failures).
[TABLE 1]
Moreover, along with measures for import substitution with domestic goods, during 
these years South Korean industrialization was sustained by various measures aimed at 
promoting exports. On the one hand, good export performance of the country was due to 
the external context, that was favorable to Korea’s export ambition: transport costs were 
decreasing, as well as tariff barriers in advanced economies. In addition, the increase of 
skilled labor force in developed countries made Korean labor-intensive goods attractive in 
international trade flows (Wade, 1992). On the other hand, some authors underline that 
government’s policies had a role during this period. In particular, they refer to the provision 
of adequate infrastructure, the maintenance of macroeconomic stability and the promotion 
of investments in physical and human capital (Krueger, 1990, p.110; World Bank, 1993, p. 
312). Lee et al. (2010) state that the government actively influenced the outward-looking 
development strategy also through credit guarantees and tax benefits for exporters. In this 
context, Korean Trade Promotion Agency (KOTRA) was created with the aim to support 
and sustain exports.
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Foreign trade gradually became one of the main source of economic development in 
South Korea. Lee et al. (2010) show that in 20 years from 1950s to the early 1970s, the 
amount of Korean exports grew by a factor of 20. The kind of exported goods also changed 
from agricultural commodities and raw materials to labor-intensive goods (see Table 2).
[TABLE 2]
The Economic Planning Board (EPB) played a leading role throughout the first 
decades of industrial development of South Korea. It was a state agency under the 
coordination of the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF), with tasks such as the 
planning of industrial strategy, the preparation of governmental budget, the allocation of 
public resources to the investment projects, the collection of data and statistics, the 
coordination and evaluation of policies. Kim and Leipziger (1993) and Chang (1994) 
described it as a «super-Ministry». In addition, the relevance of this body is testified by the 
fact that the Head of the EPB was Deputy Prime Minister de jure.
In the 1970s, upgrading the industrial structure became the primary goal of the 
government. The South Korea «Big Push» of those years was characterized by a fast 
growth of heavy and high-value added  industries, such as chemicals, steel and basic metal 
industries, shipbuilding, manufacture of machinery and electrical equipment (Lim, 2012). 
In these sectors government’s investments were performed in order to renovate industrial 
plants, sustain total exports and reach economies of scale. During this decade, heavy 
industries overcame light ones in terms of value added (see Table 1).
Several measures implemented by the government and the EPB were aimed to foster 
the shift from light sectors to heavy and chemical industries (HCIs). They ranged from the 
concession of low-cost credit and tax incentives to firms operating in target sectors, the 
direct participation of the National Investment Fund in risky projects, the protection against 
competitive imports in certain goods, the erection of entry barriers in specific markets (see 
Amsden, 1989, and Rodrik, 1995, for details). In this process, foreign direct investments 
remained irrelevant since the governments tried to keep the economic system as 
independent as possible from foreign hands. When foreign investments were involved in 
national industrial programs, the government imposed that technology transfer took place 
through the purchase of ready-to-use plants or through agreements for which foreign 
customers provided everything needed to start production, from design to projects and 
quality control systems. In the heavy industries the most common tools for technology 
transfer were the acquisition of foreign patents, reverse engineering and the importation of 
machinery and plants with related technical assistance, in particular from Japan (Amsden, 
1989, Chung and Suh, 2007).
Government intervention during this decade was strongly selective targeting the 
industries and companies deemed as strategic. For example, subsidized credit was 
disbursed on a discretionary basis, by granting long-term loans exclusively to companies 
operating in industrial sectors defined by the government as priorities (Amsden, 1989; 
Rodrik, 1995). Through this mechanism, the government favored companies such 
Ssangyong in the cement sector, POSCO (already publicly owned) in the steel industry, 
Hyundai in shipbuilding, Hyundai, Samsung and Daewoo in construction.
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At the end of Park’s era and after twenty years of public policies, Korean economy 
had changed profoundly: agriculture became less and less important whereas the 
manufacture generated the vast majority of the wealth (Table 3).
[TABLE 3]
3.2 The industrial policies in the 1980s
The situation described so far underwent huge transformations in the 1980s. Park’s death in 
1979 paved the way for the transition to a fully democratic form of government. In the 
economy, the competition coming from China and other South-East Asian economies was 
stronger and stronger in particular in steel industry, shipbuilding and car industry, as those 
countries benefited from lower costs of labor (Cuming, 1984).
The new government led by Chun Doo Hwan attempted to reduce the 
macroeconomic instability and to internationalize Korean enterprises with the 1982 
Comprehensive Economic Stabilization Program. Moreover, as it was happening in the 
major industrialized economies, South Korean economy started to be more open to 
international flows through participation to GATT and Uruguay Round (Lee et al., 2010). 
Tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade started to decrease and constraints to foreign direct 
investments (FDIs) were removed. The Fair Trade Commission was created in 1980 with 
the aim to manage the liberalization processes and competition (Lim, 2012). The public 
strategy for science and technology (S&T) also changed. Up until then, the technological 
progress simply came from the acquisition of foreign technology. With the 1982 National 
R&D Program, public policies were focused on the development of domestic technologies. 
Through this program the government, supported by universities and private companies, 
targeted the research projects to be promoted were selected. R&D activity was largely 
supported through private investments. Private companies, especially the larger ones, had 
adequate financial resources to undertake even risky research projects and had a well-
educated workforce suitable for research activities. The R&D department was gradually 
becoming one of the most important for economic performance of private companies, 
which could no longer exploit the cost advantages in order to compete on international 
markets. In this framework involvement of private actors and university in targeting S&T 
projects allowed the government to get access to information extremely relevant for the 
decision-making processes related to industrial policy. Indeed, as argued by the literature 
on the topic (see, e.g., Hausmann and Rodrik, 2002), a systemic approach to industrial 
policy, involving all the relevant actors, appeared as way to bridge the informative gap 
between government and targets of intervention, mitigating possible government failures.
Apparently, during the 1980s South Korea experienced a discontinuity in the 
industrial strategy of the government, probably also in light of a new international context, 
where Washington Consensus was suggesting a drastic reduction of the public role in 
economic dynamics. In this context some observers argued that industrial policies 
implemented in the 1960s and 1970s were the cause of important problems of overcapacity 
in Korean heavy industries, which led to strong macroeconomic imbalances in 1980s (Park, 
2005). Accordingly, during this period the emphasis shifted from growth-first policies to 
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the consolidation of growth with stability and from a government-led economy to a private-
led one (Koh, 2010).
However, according to some others (see, e.g., Lim, 2012) this shift was more formal 
than substantial and the state kept an important power in the economy. Indeed, during the 
1980s the government approved some other selective industrial policies, such as anti-
competitive measures aiming at rationalizing and restructuring the industrial sectors that 
were suffering from overcapacity (i.e. energy sectors, automotive and machinery industry). 
Along with the introduction of tax benefits for companies operating in these sectors, the 
government supported the erection of barriers to entry in specific markets and imposed 
some mergers and acquisitions. This ultimately generated an increasing in market 
concentration and size of industrial groups (the so-called chaebol), which de facto were the 
only entities with the necessary resources to acquire businesses in crisis. The reorganization 
was generally conducted according to the principle that there would be a chaebol for each 
industrial sector (Cumings, 1984). These measures were extended to many more sectors in 
the second half of the decade, with relevant impact on the ability of South Korea to 
compete in international markets.
As a conclusion, the “big push” of the 1960s and 1970s, where the government had 
assumed a sharply interventionist role in the economy, had led in the 1980s to completely 
different industrial structure and ability to compete in international markets. The upgrade of 
the Korean economy was per se enough to justify a change in industrial approach that start 
to rely more on market dynamics, but with modalities that allowed the government to keep 
control on competition through R&D policies and markets concentration.
3.3 The period until the 2008 crisis
Liberalization trends continued during Roh Tae-woo and Kim Youg-sam’s 
administrations, in office during the 1990s. The government approved the measures 
contained in the 1993 Five-Year Plan as agreement with the private sector, after a bottom-
up decision-making process. The plan indicated the will of the public entity to reduce its 
direct presence in the economy and to favor private economic initiative. Furthermore, the 
Economic Planning Board was suppressed and its tasks were transferred to the new 
Ministry of Strategy and Finance in 1994.
The financial crisis that burst in 1997 in Southeast Asia contributed to further change 
the role of the state in the economy. Important interventions in this period refer to rescue 
packages approved in favor of the financial sector, consisting in bailing out the two largest 
banks of the country, tightening the regulation for financial institutions and creating the 
Financial Supervisory Commission (Lee et al., 2007; Koh, 2010). Moreover, to obtain from 
IMF the necessary loan to cope with the crisis, South Korea accepted to implement IMF’s 
structural adjustment programs, which demanded public interventions for macroeconomic 
stability, rigorous monetary policies, markets liberalization, privatization of public 
companies, and fiscal austerity (Koh, 2010). 
Nevertheless, whilst apparently the government was shrinking its role in South 
Korean economy during these years, at the end of the 1990s emerged clearly a new 
important public function related to foster technological innovation. In 1999 the Korea 
Knowledge-Based Economy Master Plan opened a new phase in government’s innovation-
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oriented measures. Hong et al. (2007) and Woo and Suh (2007) assert that the main goal of 
the government was to strengthen the innovative and research capacities, in particular in 
ICTs. High investments in physical infrastructure and actions to promote competition were 
implemented in ICTs and related sectors. These investments were also a way to respond to 
the 1997 crisis that had generated rising unemployment and decreasing GDP.
In 1999 the country recovered from the crisis and started to grow again (see Table 4). 
In this context, South Korean exports in international markets acquired new vigor, within 
an institutional framework where the establishment of trade agreements with foreign 
economies was one of the government’s priorities. During the 2000s, numerous bilateral 
agreements were signed with several important trade partner, including the United States 
and European Union (MOTIE, 2014a). The positive economic framework of early 2000s 
continued until the 2007 global financial crisis. 
At the beginning of 2008 the rise in prices of oil and raw materials was worsening the 
Korean balance of payment. When 2007 financial crisis impacted the global economy the 
situation got further worse. The fall in global demand hit Korean exports and the GDP fell 
by 3.3 per cent in the last quarter of 2008 (Moon, 2009). Nevertheless, recovery from the 
2008 crisis was as fast as in 1997. Lee Myung-bak’s government implemented 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies to cope with the crisis. Following the 
depreciation of the won and the renewed stability of raw material prices, Korean exports 
were re-launched and, in 2010, the annual growth rate returned at 6.5 percent (Moon, 
2010).
[TABLE 4]
4. The Korean economy today: the «creative economy» strategy
With the government in office at the end of 2012, led by Park Geun-hye, daughter of 
General Park, there seems to have been a new change of perspective in politics for 
industrial development in South Korea. With the liberalizations of the 1980s and 1990s, the 
Korean government had certainly moved to some extent towards reducing its role in 
influencing the direction of economic development. In the aftermath of the global financial 
crisis, however, government programs seem to openly reveal the return to a strategic role of 
public administration in industrial dynamics.
In this context, the Three-Year Plan for Economic Innovation (2014-2017) has been 
one of the most relevant action promoted by the government (MOSF, 2014). On the one 
hand, the interventions included in the plan are of “horizontal” nature, aiming to foster 
efficiency and effectiveness of public administration and regulate the labor market and the 
welfare system. On the other hand, the Plan draws a specific trajectory for the future 
development of the Korean economy, focusing on innovation and the promotion of a 
“creative economy” (Howkins, 2001; Tassinari et al., 2015). As described in the MOSF 
(2013), the main goal is to make South Korea an economy in which «creativity and 
imagination will be combined with science, technology and ICT to create new industries 
and markets, and to make existing industries stronger and thus create good jobs». 
Specifically, the reference to “good jobs” appears to be connected to the social concerns 
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about skill mismatch and over-education, emerged in recent years. Indeed, latest statistics 
show a relevant share of workers with high educational levels (58 per cent in 2016 of the 
workforce) coupled with rising youth unemployment rates (constantly increasing in 2012-
2016 period) (Lee, 2017; Lee et al. 2018).
Following this general goal, the Plan identifies six main strategic lines of intervention 
(see Table 5).
[TABLE 5]
In this context, one of the most important aspect of the plan is the relevance conferred 
to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and to venture capital. Indeed, a well-known 
characteristic of the Korean industrial structure is that it is dominated by the so-called 
chaebols (namely huge corporations), which are often under the control of a single family 
that operates in several diversified sectors. However, Korean economy is also characterized 
by a huge number of a small or medium enterprises that coexist with these concentrations 
of economic power. In this scenario tackling SME’s problems could be essential to reach 
key industrial objectives. Specifically, the most critical issues affecting the SMEs are, on 
the one hand, the hard competition suffered from Asian manufactures (and in particular 
from the Chinese one) and, on the other hand, the dependence on supply contracts with 
larger companies (Eichengreen et al., 2015). This latter point directly refers to the need for 
a better «economic democracy». With this expression, the government supports the idea 
that a higher level of equality within the Korean industrial system and a greater cooperation 
between SMEs and chaebols are fundamental for future economic development and in 
particular for bridging the gap existing in economic performance between SMEs and large 
enterprises (see Table 5, number 2). For instance, productivity of the small firms is only the 
28 percent of  big firms’ productivity (OECD, 2014).
In this framework, the upgrading process of SMEs is foster by the government 
through the promotion of innovation and creativity. The development of creative capacities 
in specifically targeted by the government as a driver of rising economic performances in 
manufacturing industries characterized by products with high level of creativity. In this 
perspective public support aim at removing financial constraints to technological 
development by granting public funding and state guarantees on private loans (Doh and 
Kim, 2014).
Along with general measures supporting SMEs, government attention is focused on 
specific industries deemed of strategic relevance for South Korean economy. Shipbuilding, 
machinery manufacturing, chemicals and automotive industry are the traditional sectors 
monitored by the government as a fundamental part of the national industrial system (Lee et 
al., 2013). However, several advanced industries are increasing enormously their relevance 
and are object of particular attention from the government. In this context ICTs and related 
industries (such as the production of  office equipment, semiconductors and communication 
devices, except the software industry) have shown very high performance in recent years 
(Eichengreen et al., 2015). Moreover, specific support is given to thirteen new key sectors, 
among which nanotechnologies, biotechnologies, robotics, bio-artificial devices, 
autonomous vehicles and green industries (MOTIE, 2014).
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In this context green economy occupies certainly a special place in government plans. 
The National Strategy for Green Growth 2009-2050 and the 2009 Five-Year Plan for Green 
Growth prove the efforts of the country in this direction. Large amounts of resources (108 
billion allocated in five years) have been made available for green projects, like R&D for 
eco-innovations and the renovation of old polluting plants (Jones and Yoo, 2011).
Along with manufacturing, the phenomenon of the tertiarization of the economy is 
more and more evident in South Korea. In 2005 the 59 percent of the Korean value added 
was created in service sectors (see Table 1), although the level of productivity of these 
sectors remains below the level reached in manufacture (OECD, 2014). The government is 
pushing forward the so-called knowledge-based services in order to promote a more 
balanced and sustained growth of the whole economy and increase productivity in the 
tertiary sector (Lee, 2016). Specifically, the Three-year Plan for Economic Innovation 
(2014-2017) has identified health care, finance and logistics as three key areas to focus on 
(MOSF, 2014c). In this context particularly important are medical assistance and personal 
services, given the rapid aging of Korean population. Although Korean health system is 
generally considered to be of good quality (Eichengreen et al., 2015), the challenge in this 
area is to succeed in attracting more patients and investors from abroad and further increase 
the sector performance. Among the measures implemented to this goal, there is for instance 
the possibility for high-quality and specialized foreign hospitals to open branches in Korean 
Free Economic Zones (MOSF, 2014c). In this framework, the Jeju Free International City 
Development Center is a project to make the island of Jeju, in the south of the peninsula, 
the reference medical center for East Asia (Goldstein, 2013, p. 67).
5. A picture of South Korean structural change 
5.1 Data and methodology
After the historical overview of South Korean industrial policy, this section aims at 
empirically analyzing the structural adjustment of the country. The idea is not to assert a 
direct causal relation between policy actions and structural development of the economy. 
As we discussed at the beginning of the paper (and as we will focus again on this topic in 
final remarks), there are many factors that have pushed Korean industrial development and 
government intervention is just one element of the framework acting in complementarity 
with others. Thus, this section wants to capture how the Korean system, as a whole, 
historically performed regard to industrial change.
To this goal, methodologically we build a composite indicator – the Economic Performance 
Index (EPI) – which ranks the South Korean manufacturing sectors according to their 
economic performance. Sectoral performance is synthesized in a composite indicator by 




3. gross fixed capital formation
4. labor productivity
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As for the methodology used for the construction of the indicator, we refer to the 
handbook of the OECD (2008). In particular, since we have variables with different 
measurement units, the first step requires the normalization of the dataset, to make them 
comparable. The method used is the min-max (OECD, 2008, p. 85), that is useful to give 
common benchmarks of economic performances internally the Korean economy:
𝑧𝑠,𝑡 =
𝑥𝑠,𝑡 ―  min𝑡 {𝑥𝑠} +  1 𝑛
   max𝑡 {𝑥𝑠} ―  min𝑡 {𝑥𝑠} +  2 𝑛   
where xs,t is the value of the variable x for the sector s at time t, maxt{xs} e mint{xs} are 
respectively the maximum and the minimum value of the same variable and n is the total 
number of sectors. After the normalization step, all the variables present data included in 
the range (0;1). We obtain in this way one matrix of variables per year. In the aggregation 
step of the analysis, where the different variables are synthesized in a single value, we use 
the Fisher combining function, which statistically assigns an high performance to those 
sectors that achieve high performance in one or more variables (this is useful to emphasize 
in the analysis the role of sectors with very high performances). The formula of the 





𝑤𝑖 ∙ log (1 ― 𝑧𝑠,𝑡)
where EPIs,t is the value of the Economic Performance Index for the sector s at time t. We 
choose to assign the same weight wi to each variable i; since we have five variables, wi in 
the last equation is equal to 0.2.
The last step is the normalization of the EPI, using the min-max method:
𝐸𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑠,𝑡 =
𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑠,𝑡 ―  min𝑡 {𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑠}
   max𝑡 {𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑠} ―  min𝑡 {𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑠}   
The higher the EPI, the higher the sectors’ economic performance.
We elaborate data from UNIDO’s database and, for export data, from UN Comtrade’s 
database, both classified by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC Rev. 
3). We compile annual rankings of sectors on the base of their economic performance. This 
exercise is performed twice. For the first application we use data for 15 industrial sectors 
defined at 2-digit level of detail, for the period 1963-2012. In the second application we 
collect more detailed data (at 3-digit level of detail) and obtain rankings of 56 sectors for 
2011 and 2012.
5.2 Results
The graphs below show the position in ranking of selected sectors: Figure 1 refers to 
three labor-intensive (or light) sectors, while Figure 2 refers to three capital-intensive (or 
heavy) sectors. Starting with the light industries, the loss of strategic value over time is 
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evident for the industries of food and tobacco (ISIC 15-16), for the textile sector (ISIC 17), 
and for the manufacturing of wearing apparel and leather products (ISIC 18-19). All these 
sectors are high in the rankings between the 1960s and 1970s, as shown in Figure 1. The 
decline starts in 1980s for food industry and textile and only in the 1990s for the production 
of wearing apparel, thanks to excellent performance in terms of exports.
[FIGURE 1]
Figure 2 show the performance of heavy industries, with a specular pattern compared 
to the light o es. Despite some fluctuations in the trend, the constant rise of capital-
intensive sectors is clear from the 1970s, especially for the manufacturing of petroleum 
products (ISIC 23), for the machinery industry (ISIC 30-33) and for the automotive 
industry (ISIC 34-35). At the end of our time series, in the 2012 these three industries 
occupy the first three position in the ranking (Figure 2).
[FIGURE 2]
To sum up, the results of this first application show a gradual rise of capital-intensive 
industries over time and, at the opposite, the continuous loss of economic performance for 
labor-intensive industries. In general, we can state that this is consistent with the trends 
highlighted in the historical analysis, namely the initial prevalence of light industries and 
then the emergence of heavy and chemical ones in the Korean industrial structure.
With the second application, we look at the rankings in more detail. Our purpose now 
is to identify economic performance of sub-sectors. Table 6 exhibits the final results in 
terms of the first ten and the last three positions in 2011 and 2012. The results show that the 
rankings relative to the two years are very similar. Consistently with historical trends, at the 
first places of the rankings we find some sub-sectors related to chemical industries. For 
instance, biotechnology, which has been recently targeted by the Korean government as one 
of the key sectors for future economic development, is included in Manufacture of basic 
chemicals. Very high economic performance is also shown by other key industries, such as 
motor vehicles, electrical equipments and shipbuilding. Specifically, the sub-sectors related 
to the manufacture of electronic components, general and special machinery, and office 
equipment occupy positions between the 8th and the 19th. Regarding sub-sectors important 
for environmental issues, the results indicate good performance for automotive (5th 
position) and manufacture of electric motors and generators (13th), but lower performance 
is shown by processing of nuclear fuel (22nd) and manufacture of batteries and electric 
accumulators (39th). Finally, despite “health industry” has more recently attracted 
considerable attention in the Korean economic development, medical instruments and 
appliances have reached a quite low performance (32nd position in ranking). Generally this 
more detailed analysis shows a rather heterogeneous picture of the Korean economy, where 
the government is targeting (according to the recent Plans) both industries with very high 
performances and sectors with low economic records (but endowed with high potential in 
terms of meta-economic value, including health security and environmental quality).
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6. Concluding remarks: government failures in a systemic view.
This paper has considered South Korean historical structural change, from an 
historical and empirical point of view, as a peculiar case to analyze the role of government 
in economic development. Starting with a rather interventionist and selective approach 
during the 1960s and 1970s, economic policies changed during the 1980s and 1990s 
fostering markets liberalization, privatizations and a less intrusive role of the government in 
the economy. Observing this historical trend, many interpretations have been proposed in 
literature about the drivers of South Korea’s industrialization and it is clear that still there is 
no unanimity about the factors that have contributed to the economic development of the 
country. Some views attribute to the market a prominent role in industrialization process, 
while others recognize in a “developmental state” the source of South Korean economic 
progress. At a general level this dispute can be referred to a more broad and ancient debate 
“State vs. Market”, as competing ways to promote economic development. Following this 
line of reasoning, prevailing in academic literature, the fundamental question that leads the 
debate is: did the Korean economy develop thanks or despite government intervention?
Even though this question could sound as a pragmatic and effective way to frame 
research lines interested in finding effective models to promote industrial development, the 
analysis conducted in the previous pages on the Korean case seems to suggest a different 
view. Indeed, a dichotomous manner to interpret economic dynamics appears to be rather 
misleading. Views in favor of the market and those in favor of an interventionist role of the 
government, both tend to neglect that economic development could be to a large extent 
interpreted as a systemic process, which is the result of historical interactions between many 
factors and actors, including  government, markets and civil society. In this perspective all 
the actors involved in the development process interact by enforcing (converging or 
competing) interests, creating a balance of forces founding a particular approach to 
economic and industrial development. In this systemic framework, markets and government 
seems to interact by influencing each other, creating complementarities and sometime 
synergies, so that it is rather difficult to assign a prevailing role to a particular factor of 
development (e.g. to imagine well performing markets without a good-supervising 
government). Thus the way for development has to be sought in virtuous relationships 
between different actors and historical circumstances, which lead the trajectory of the 
system as a whole. This seems to be the “secret recipe” of South Korean industrial 
development.
In South Korea, industry-government relationship and the role played by public 
administration in governing the markets are historically evolved under the pressures of 
different interest groups, changes in national economic structure, economic crisis, 
international constraints and so forth. In this framework, the case for a possible 
government’s ability to respond effectively and efficiently to the general interest of the 
society (by mitigating government failures) has to be searched in the peculiar mechanisms 
founding the relationship between government, industry and civil society. Specifically 
some important features of this relationship deserve to be briefly recalled.
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First, the Korean experience reveals how important was to have a rather 
homogeneous pool of interests in the society. The equal distribution of land and wealth at 
the beginning of the industrialization process was essential to define a collective interest 
around the goals of industrialization and economic growth and to share benefits of 
development. In particular it was the civil society and a student revolution to create the 
popular pressures that constrained the new government to create institutions and strategies 
for economic development. In this context the general level of education of the population 
(Rodrik, 1995; Booth, 1999), since the Japanese domination, was creating people ready to 
actively participate to the economic and political life of the country, binding in a 
fundamental way industrial processes and government’s actions to the supervision of civil 
society.
Second, concerning the mechanisms of policy implementation, public investments in 
strategic industries were not provided in an “aseptic” contest, regardless the historical 
circumstances and of different interests at stake. On the contrary, industrial policy was 
implemented in a peculiar (formal and informal) institutional framework involving the 
relationship between public bureaucracy and private sector. Indeed, South Korea has been 
characterized by a reciprocal control mechanism that has worked through the concession of 
different incentives to the private sector on the bases of the achievement of certain 
performance defined by the gover ment (Amsden, 2001). The presence of this  reciprocal 
control mechanism was an essential element to control for the effectiveness of the industrial 
policies, mitigating potential sources of government failures. Indeed, what is typical of this 
mechanism is that it works only if the bureaucracy is independent enough to resist external 
pressures. In this context, the rent-seekers (i.e. private subjects that try to influence 
decision-making processes), cannot succeed in distorting public actions toward particular 
interest. In the Korean industrialization, few powerful chaebols were not interested in 
participating in rent contests and there were no other interest groups with sufficient power 
to influence governmental decisions (Chang, 1994). Moreover, concerning cultural 
characteristics, Confucianism promoted meritocracy, morality and honesty, in particular for 
employed in public offices (Bertoldi, 1996), since they perceived their role as direct involve 
in the collective wellbeing. All these aspects contributed to the strength of Korean 
government, described as a «Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Industrializing Regime […] 
ubiquitous in economy and society: penetrating, comprehensive, highly articulated, and 
relatively autonomous of particular groups and classes» (Cumings, 1984, p. 28).
To note that a systemic approach to industrial policy, involving all the relevant actors 
of the system, continued also after the 1980s, when apparently South Korea experienced a 
shift in industrial strategy, with a reduction of the public role in economic dynamics in 
favor of freer markets. Indeed, markets liberalization occurred trough a bottom-up decision-
making process, where industries were “ready” for a more competitive context and granted 
their consent to the government. This strict relationship between government and national 
industry could further contribute to mitigate government failures by helping to bridge the 
informative gap between government and targets of intervention.
Third, all the domestic conditions mentioned above intertwined with an international 
context particularly favorable to South Korean economic growth. Indeed, good export 
performances were essential to Korean industrialization and these were facilitated by a 
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reduction in barriers to trade in advanced economies and decreasing international transport 
costs.
To conclude, there were not one single element at the base of Korean 
industrialization, as instead academic literature often tends to emphasize. Rather, peculiar 
systemic conditions have to be considered. Elements of success are not merely related to 
political techniques or economic prescriptions, but they are related to the structure of the 
society as a whole and the interests it express in different historical stages. This could 
explain why South Korean model of development is not easy to replicate successfully. 
From this point of view, the study of the Korean experience can be useful, not because it is 
a model to reproduce everywhere, but because it is a valid source of suggestions on the 
crucial elements on which the debate on how to mitigate government failures could be re-
open in the name of the public interest.
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Table 1. Manufacturing value added (share on total manufacture, selected years). 
 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2009 
Light industries: 78.9 76.6 56.5 38.7 26.7 13.8 
- Food, beverage and tobacco – – 19.6 10.8 7.2 5.1 
- Textile, leather – – 28.0 23.3 13.3 4.1 
- Other (paper, wood) – – 8.9 4.6 6.2 4.6 
Heavy industries: 21.1 23.4 39.8 58.4 70.0 84.9 
- Machinery – – 8.1 16.6 23.5 33.9 
- Transport equipment – – 8.5 5.2 11.7 17.5 
- Chemicals and plastics – – 14.2 19.9 14.4 25.5 
- Other (metal, mineral) – – 9.0 16.7 20.4 18.0 
Manufacturing n.e.c.  – – 3.7 2.9 3.3 1.3 
Source: authors’ elaboration on data from Bank of Korea and OECD.  
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Table 2. Exported goods (share on total exports, selected years, SITC Rev. 1). 
 1962 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2013 
Food and live animals 38.6 7.8 11.9 6.6 3.7 3.1 2.2 1.4 0.9 0.9 
Beverages and tobacco 0.2 1.7 1.3 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 
Crude materials. 
Inedible, except fuels 
37.6 12.0 3.0 1.9 1.0 1.4 1.5 1.1 1.0 1.2 
Mineral fuels, 
lubrificants 
4.9 1.0 2.1 0.2 3.1 2.1 2.0 5.5 6.3 9.5 
Animals and vegetable 
oils and fats 
0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Chemicals 1.7 1.4 1.5 4.5 3.3 4.5 7.3 8.1 9.8 11.8 
Manufact. goods 
classified by material 
10.9 26.4 29.2 35.7 23.3 22.7 22.6 17.9 14.5 12.9 
Machinery and 
transport equip. 
2.6 7.4 13.8 19.7 36.4 39.4 51.5 57.0 58.7 54.7 
Miscellaneous man. 
articles 
3.4 42.2 37.1 30.3 28.8 26.8 12.8 9.0 8.6 8.6 
Commod. & transacts. 
Other not class.  
0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Source: authors’ elaboration on data from UN Comtrade. 
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1953 47.3 1.1 9.0 2.6 40.0 
1960 36.8 2.1 13.8 4.1 43.2 
1965 38.0 2.0 18.0 4.8 37.2 
1970 26.9 1.5 20.9 7.1 43.6 
1975 26.9 1.5 22.2 5.7 43.7 
1980 16.0 1.4 24.6 10.0 48.0 
1985 13.3 1.3 26.7 9.7 49.0 
1990 8.7 0.8 26.6 12.4 51.5 
1995 6.2 0.5 26.7 12.0 54.6 
2000 4.6 0.3 28.3 9.5 57.3 
2005 3.3 0.3 27.5 9.9 59.0 
2012 2.6 0.2 31.1 7.9 58.2 
Source: authors’ elaboration on data from Bank of Korea.  
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Table 4. Main economic indicators (1996-2004, selected years). 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2004 
GDP per capita (US$) 12197 11176 7355 9438 10841 15898 
GDP real growth (%) 7.2 5.8 -5.7 10.7 8.8 4.9 
Net exports (US$) -16.7 -6.2 39.5 25.3 15.6 39.3 
- Exports 124.4 132.4 127.5 136.0 169.5 256.0 
- Imports 141.1 138.6 88.0 110.8 153.9 216.8 
Gross Investment Ratio (%) 38.1 35.6 25.2 29.1 30.7 32.3 
Gross Saving Ratio (%) 34.8 34.6 36.6 34.6 33.0 35.5 
Unemployment rate (%) - 2.6 7.0 6.3 4.1 3.5 
Source: adapted from Bank of Korea (2014). 
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Table 5. Strategies and tasks in the Three-Year Plan for Economic Innovation. 
CREATIVE ECONOMY ACTION PLAN AND MEASURE TO ESTABLISH A CREATIVE ECONOMIC ECOSYSTEM 
1. Compensate creativity and create an ecosystem that promotes the creation of startups 
a) Venture capital and startups 
Institutionalization of crowd funding; creation of the Future 
Creation Fund (500 billion won) 
b) Patents 
Country Patent Strategy Blueprint: ease and promote the 
patenting of creative ideas; incentivize companies that 
introduce inventions of their employees 
2. Strengthen the role of SMEs and startups and facilitating the access in foreign markets 
a) New products Support through public procurement system 
b) Investments in ventures and SMEs 
Measure for a Venture-Startup Funding Ecosystem: financial 
support and promotion for mergers and acquisitions and for 
listing in stock markets for innovative SMEs 
c) Startups: accessing foreign markets 
Support for internationalization from public consulting centres 
in Korea and foreign countries (Global Startup Support 
Centre) 
d) Cooperation between small, medium and 
large enterprises 
Promote cooperation projects and outcome sharing systems 
between SMEs and chaebol 
e) Training and human resource shortages 
Cooperation between SMEs, local governments and training 
centres to improve the matching between human resource 
demand and supply 
3. Promote new markets and new industries 
a) Competitiveness and productivity in 
existing sectors 
Promote the introduction of IT management systems and the 
development of green innovations. Public investments in 
transport infrastructures (LTE netweork, smart driving) 
b) Software industry 
Improve software education and internet security. 
Development of cloud computing and of Big Data analysis. 
Creation of Korea Digital Contents Fund (400 billion won) 
digital contents industry (music, games, movies) 
c) Biomedical, Nano-Technology, Green 
Industries 
Support for the development of strategic industries through 
public funds 
4. Foster global creative talent 
a) Education system 
Improve school and university systems to eliminate 
unnecessary specializations. After school projects can help 
spreading entrepreneurial culture (Technology Startup Camp 
and One-to-One Mentoring) 
b) Domestic inflow of creative talent 
Creation of a “Startup Visa” for foreign young entrepreneurs 
that start new businesses in Korea 
5. Strengthen the innovation capacity of science, technology and ICTs 
a) Research activity and commercialization 
of research outcomes 
40 per cent increase in public funds for basic research; suppot 
for young people with creative ideas 
b) Innovation capacity and ICTs 
Investments in new generation communication technologies 
(5G, next-generation Wi-Fi, realistic media) 
c) Regional innovation of Universities 
Creation of regional organizations for technology planning and 
management 
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6. Create a creative economic culture 
a) Creative culture 
Encourage the development of new ideas; creation of 
“Creative Korea” online portal with information about creative 
economy strategy 
b) Fusing creative ideas with public 
resources 
Open access of government data for private citizens (Public 
Information Supply and Use Stimulation Act) 
c) Innovating government working methods 
New communication methods between administrative agencies 
to improve cooperation; use of comprehensive analyses of big 
data for policy decisions 
Notes: strategies are in numbered rows; for each strategy, tasks are in the left column, action plans in 
the right column. 
Source: authors’ elaboration from MOSF (2013) 
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Figure 1. Positions in ranking of selected light sectors (1963-2012). 
 
 
Page 26 of 28
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ijoem





























































International Journal of Em
erging M
arkets
Figure 2. Positions in ranking of selected heavy sectors (1963-2012). 
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Table 6. Results of the second application (56 sub-sectors, ISIC 3-digit, 2011 and 2012). 
Pos. 2011 2012 
1 242  Manufacture of other chemical products 232  Manufacture of refined petroleum products 
2 351  Building and repairing of ships and boats 242  Manufacture of other chemical products 
3 232  Manufacture of refined petroleum products 271  Manufacture of basic iron and steel 
4 361  Manufacture of furniture 361  Manufacture of furniture 
5 271  Manufacture of basic iron and steel 341  Manufacture of motor vehicles 
6 341  Manufacture of motor vehicles 241  Manufacture of basic chemicals 
7 241  Manufacture of basic chemicals 319  Manufacture of other electrical equipment 
n.e.c. 
8 319  Manufacture of other electrical equipment 
n.e.c. 
321  Manufacture of electronic valves and tubes 
and other electronic components 
9 321  Manufacture of electronic valves and tubes 
and other electronic components 
323  Manufacture of television and radio receivers, 
sound or video recording or reproducing apparatus 
10 323  Manufacture of television and radio receivers, 
sound or video recording or reproducing apparatus 
289  Manufacture of other fabricated metal 
products; metal working service activities 
[…] […] […] 
54 182  Dressing and dyeing of fur; manufacture of 
articles of fur 
221  Publishing 
55 201  Sawmilling and planing of wood 333  Manufacture of watches and clocks 
56 231  Manufacture of coke oven products 231  Manufacture of coke oven products 
Page 28 of 28
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ijoem
International Journal of Emerging Markets
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
